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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 This commentary appraises recent developments in 
international criminal law, with an emphasis on the jurisprudence 
engendered by the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR” or “Tribunal”) during 2007.  It evaluates trends 
in the ICTR’s jurisprudence during the year 2007 in relation to 
substantive, procedural and evidentiary aspects of international 
criminal law. 
¶2 In dealing with several issues addressed by the ICTR, the 
ICTR’s jurisprudence is examined in a comparative perspective, 
drawing on the experiences of other Tribunals, particularly the 
U.N. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).  Along with 
its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, since its incep-
tion, the permanent International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has also 
rendered a few decisions that contribute to the current corpus of 
international criminal law.  A couple of the ICC decisions have 
dealt specifically with issues similar to those addressed by the 
ICTR.  Where relevant to this commentary, the ICTR’s jurispru-
dence is compared and contrasted with the ICC’s decisions and 
relevant provisions of the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.  In some instances, comparative criminal law from some 
national jurisdictions is also invoked. 
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¶3 It is noteworthy that over the course of 2007, by and large, 
the ICTR did not break much new ground in the arena of interna-
tional criminal law.  Nevertheless, the ICTR addressed some criti-
cal issues that deserve evaluation.  Some of the decisions reached 
by the ICTR provide important elaboration as to the position of 
international criminal law, while others raise controversies.  More-
over, a number of decisions reached by the ICTR’s Appeals 
Chamber—a chamber also shared by the ICTY, and the only ap-
pellate and highest court—were not unanimous.  Many of these 
decisions generated important dissents, thus pointing to conflicting 
signals from the ICTR.  While absence of unanimity by the judges 
raises challenges as to the current status of international law, ar-
guably it equally creates some room for the possibility of remedy-
ing some questionable positions in the future, and thus may lead to 
the improvement of international criminal jurisprudence. 
¶4 In appraising the issues addressed by the ICTR over the 
course of 2007, this Article is arranged as follows: Part II evaluates 
the ICTR’s approach to the elements, participation in, and proof of 
the crime of rape, as well as issues arising from the Tribunal’s ap-
proach.  The issues raised include the status of circumstantial evi-
dence, and its application to the crime of rape, the scope of com-
mission as a mode of criminal participation, and the status in the 
Tribunal’s jurisprudence of the concepts of ‘lesser included or sub-
sumed’ crimes or modes of liability and ‘re-qualification’ of 
crimes.  Part III deals with the ICTR’s approach to extermination 
as a crime against humanity, while the crimes of direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, 
and persecution as crime against humanity are covered in Parts IV, 
V and VI respectively.  These are followed by some procedural 
and evidentiary aspects of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, namely, 
specificity in pleading and the status quo of hearsay evidence.  
They are addressed in Parts VII and VIII respectively.  Concluding 
the analysis is Part IX, which also comments, in brief, on other is-
sues addressed by the Tribunal, including the notion of ‘witness 
proofing;’ the scope of the rights of the accused, such as the right 
to be tried in one’s presence and the right to compensation; joint 
criminal enterprise liability; the powers of Trial Chambers to con-
trol proceedings, and issues arising from the Tribunal’s plea of 
guilty jurisprudence. 
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II. THE CRIME OF RAPE: ELEMENTS, PARTICIPATION IN AND PROOF 
OF THE CRIME 
¶5 The ICTR’s jurisprudence during the period under review 
(particularly the Appeals Chamber jurisprudence1) dealt with the 
elements of the crime of rape in international law.  It also ad-
dressed issues relating to the proof of the elements of the crime, in 
particular, the proof of penetration. While reiterating established 
ICTR jurisprudence that a single witness’s testimony may suffice 
to prove rape (and therefore that corroboration is not mandatory), 
the jurisprudence analyzed the status quo, the probative value and 
the manner in which ‘circumstantial evidence’ is to be approached 
and assessed.  The ICTR’s approach to some of these issues is con-
troversial.  In other respects, the jurisprudence raises questions as 
to the scope of ‘commission’ as a mode of criminal participation, 
and whether or not, in dealing with rape, the Appeals Chamber 
lowered the threshold established in past cases for justifying appel-
late intervention in factual findings reached by a Trial Chamber. 
¶6 In relation to the elements of rape, it appears that during the 
period under review, the ICTR reiterated the position in earlier 
judgments, notably Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor2 (a position similar 
to that taken by the ICTY in the Prosecutor v. Kunarac Judgment3) 
that, unlike other acts of sexual violence, rape requires proof of 
acts of penetration of the victim’s vagina or anus by the perpetra-
tor’s penis or any other object used by the perpetrator, without the 
consent of the victim.  The need to prove these elements appears to 
underpin the Appeals Chamber’s 21 May 2007 Judgment in Mu-
himana v. Prosecutor,4 where the Chamber did not disturb the 
Trial Chamber’s legal findings on the elements defining rape in 
international law.  While the Muhimana Trial Chamber in its 
                                                 
1 The Tribunal’s Statute establishes three courts of first instance entitled Trial 
Chambers.  Under Article 24 of the Statute, both the Prosecution and the De-
fense may appeal a judgment of a Trial Chamber.  Appeals lie to the Appeals 
Chamber, which is the only and last court of appeal.  The Appeals Chamber of 
the ICTR also serves the ICTY. 
2 For the ICTR’s previous judgments see Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, Case No. 
ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 147-157 (July 7, 2006) [hereinafter 
Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment]. 
3 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1e-A, Appeals Judg-
ment, ¶ 127 (June 12, 2002). 
4 See Muhimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 
101-104 (May 21, 2007) [hereinafter Muhimana Appeals Judgment]. 
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Judgment of 28 April 2005 appears to have “preferred”5 the defini-
tion of rape as enunciated in Prosecutor v. Akayesu (namely that 
rape and sexual violence means a physical invasion of a sexual na-
ture committed on a person under circumstances which are coer-
cive6), the same Chamber also notes that the Akayesu definition is 
not incompatible with that in Kunarac.7  As noted above, the 
Kunarac Judgment expressly requires proof of the said elements. 
¶7 In addressing matters of evidence and proof of the elements 
of rape (in particular penetration of the victim), however, it is 
noteworthy that during the period under review, and specifically in 
the Muhimana Appeals Judgment, the ICTR adopted a controver-
sial approach.  It is noteworthy that the Tribunal reiterates the posi-
tions adopted in earlier cases: first, that to establish any crime un-
der the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (including the crime of rape—a 
crime in relation to which some national systems take approaches 
that discriminate against rape victims8), corroboration is not man-
datory (such that a Chamber may rely only on single piece of evi-
dence, as long as it is credible9),—a position similar to that taken 
by the ICTY10 and the ICC11; and secondly, that circumstantial evi-
dence may sustain a conviction.12  The ICTR’s application of these 
                                                 
5 See Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment, ¶ 551 (Trial 
Chamber III, Apr. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Muhimana Trial Judgment]. 
6 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-1996-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 598 
& 688 (Trial Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu Trial Chamber 
Judgment]. 
7 Muhimana Trial Judgment, supra note 5, ¶ 550. 
8 For instance, some require corroboration of the evidence of the victim, while 
others allow the admission of the sexual history of the victims.  See generally 
Susan Power, Critical Legal Studies and the Potential for the Reform of Irish 




9 Muhimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 4, ¶ 101 (invoking with approval 
previous judgments, namely, Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 72, 
& Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 92 
(July 9, 2004) [hereinafter Niyitegeka Appeals Judgment]). 
10 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 
506 (Feb. 20, 2001). 
11 Under Rule 63(4) of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, “a Chamber 
shall not impose a legal requirement that corroboration is required in order to 
prove any criminal court, in particular, crimes of sexual violence” (emphasis 
added). 
12 Muhimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 4, ¶ 49 (citing with approval the 
Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 115).  The ICTY takes a similar 
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principles in the Muhimana Appeals Judgment, however, raises 
important questions.  In that judgment, the majority of the Appeals 
Chamber (Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Schomburg dissented in 
part) vacated the Trial Chamber’s conviction of Muhimana for 
rape as a crime against humanity.  According to the majority, there 
was insufficient evidence to prove that Muhimana personally raped 
the two victims in order to hold him culpable for committing the 
crime pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Tribunal’s Statute.13  Para-
graph 6 of the indictment alleged that Muhimana had committed 
the rapes:  
On or about 7 April 1994 in Gishyita town Gishyita 
sector, Gishyita commune, Mikaeli Muhimana 
brought two civilian women Goretti Mukashyaka 
and Languida Kamukina into his house and raped 
them.  Thereafter he drove them naked out of his 
house and invited Interahamwe14 and other civilians 
to come and see how naked Tutsi girls looked like.  
Mikaeli Muhimana then directed the Interahamwe 
to part the girls’ legs to provide onlookers with a 
clear view of the girls’ vaginas.15 
The Appeals Chamber found fault with the Trial Chamber’s reli-
ance on the evidence of a sole Prosecution witness, “AP”, and the 
Trial Chamber’s following reasoning: 
Although Witness AP was not an eye witness to the 
rape of Goretti and Languida, the Chamber infers 
that the Accused raped them on the basis of the fol-
lowing factors: the witness saw the Accused take 
                                                                                                             
position.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeals 
Judgment, ¶ 303 (Oct. 23, 2001). 
13 Muhimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 4, ¶¶ 46-53.  While the Chamber 
focuses on the crime of rape in general, it appears that the main issue concerns 
one of the elements of rape, namely whether the Accused personally penetrated 
the victims.  Otherwise, it appears that the other element, namely, absence of 
consent, was not in issue. 
14 The Interahamwe was a paramilitary or militia group that physically commit-
ted the majority of the crimes perpetrated during the atrocities of 1994 in various 
locations in Rwanda. 
15 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-I, Revised Amended Indict-
ment, at 4 (July 7, 2004).  
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the girls into his house; she heard them scream, 
mentioning the Accused’s name and stating that 
they ‘did not expect him to do that’ to them; finally 
the witnesses saw the Accused lead the victims out 
of his house, stark naked, and she noticed that they 
were walking ‘with their legs apart.’16 
While pointing out that Muhimana could bear responsibility for 
aiding and abetting17 the rapes (but could not be so held culpable 
as the indictment did not charge him for that mode of responsibil-
ity), the Appeals Chamber overturned Muhimana’s culpability for 
committing rape on the following reasoning: 
[I]t is apparent from witness AP’s testimony that the 
Appellant was not alone with the young women in 
the house at the relevant time. Witness AP testified 
that ‘[a]mong the voices coming from inside the 
house, the witness also recognized the voice of 
Bourgmester Sikubwabo, telling the girls to ‘shut 
up.’’ Consequently, the Appeals Chamber is not 
persuaded that the Trial Chamber acted reasonably 
in determining that it was the Appellant who raped 
the two women, rather than another person present 
in the house, such as Sikubwabo.18 
The Appeal Chamber’s approaches in Muhimana are controversial, 
and, in some instances, they appear to represent problematic pos-
tures that undercut the evolution of international criminal law. The 
following issues are noteworthy. 
                                                 
16 Muhimana Trial Judgment, supra note 5, ¶ 32. 
17 Article 6(1) of the ICTR’s Statute, which is equivalent to Article 7(1) of the 
ICTY Statute, enshrines several modes of criminal participation.  In addition to 
prescribing ‘committing’ and ‘aiding and abetting’ as modes, these provisions 
prescribe criminal responsibility for those who plan, instigate or order the 
crimes. 
18 Muhimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 4, ¶ 51. 
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A. The Status Quo of Circumstantial Evidence and the Threshold 
for Appellate Intervention in Relation to Factual Findings 
Concerning the Crime of Rape: Did the Appeals Chamber Depart 
From Existing Jurisprudence? 
¶8 Firstly, with respect to the Appeals Chamber’s approach to 
circumstantial evidence as it relates to the crime of rape, it may be 
argued that the Chamber adopts a stance somewhat different from 
its jurisprudence with respect to the margin of deference that must 
be accorded to Trial Chambers as ‘triers of fact’ in assessing and 
evaluating evidence.  Earlier in the same judgment, the Chamber 
explained that with respect to errors of fact, the established juris-
prudence of the Chamber is that the Appeals Chamber will not 
lightly overturn findings of fact made by a Trial Chamber: 
Where the Defence19 alleges an erroneous finding of 
fact, the Appeals Chamber must give deference to 
the Trial Chamber that received the evidence at 
trial, and it will only interfere in those findings 
where no reasonable trier of fact could have 
reached the same finding or where the finding is 
wholly erroneous.  Furthermore, the erroneous find-
ing will be revoked or revised only if the error occa-
sioned a miscarriage of justice.20 
The same approach is adopted in earlier ICTR judgments,21 as well 
as those by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.22  The Muhimana Appeals 
Judgment does not elaborately explain how the threshold under-
lined in the above quotation was met as to justify appellate inter-
vention with respect to the Trial Chamber’s findings in relation to 
                                                 
19 Other Appeals Chamber judgments are clear that this position similarly ap-
plies when the Prosecution alleges an erroneous finding of fact by a Trial 
Chamber.  See, e.g., Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Appeals 
Judgment, ¶¶ 21-23 (May 26, 2003) [hereinafter Rutaganda Appeals Judgment]. 
20 Muhimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 4, ¶ 8 (emphasis added). 
21 See, e.g., Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 8; Kajelijeli v. Prose-
cutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 5 (May 23, 2005). 
22 See, e.g.. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 40 
(Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judg-
ment, ¶¶ 18-19 (Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 29-30 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Kupreskic Appeals 
Judgment].  
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the rape of the two victims.  Indeed, as Judges Shahabuddeen and 
Schomburg explained in their partly dissenting opinion, although 
there might have been multiple possibilities as to who raped the 
victims (and it was the duty of the Trial Chamber to sort out those 
possibilities),23  
[i]t was open to the Trial Chamber to determine that 
rape had been committed.  Indeed, we do not find 
that the Appeals Chamber holds otherwise.  Its dif-
ficulty was whether it was the appellant who raped 
the girls.  On this, we consider that it was open to 
the Trial Chamber to find that it was the appellant 
who raped the girls: it was he who led them into his 
house, who led them out of it, and whose name they 
called out saying that they ‘did not expect him to do 
that’ to them.  Furthermore, when he led them out 
of the house they were ‘stark naked’ and were walk-
ing ‘with their legs apart.’24 
While it is not clear if the Muhimana Appeals Judgment could 
have reached a different position if the same evidence in question 
related to a crime other than rape (e.g., a murder25), the approach 
adopted by the Appeals Chamber may raise controversy as to 
whether the threshold for appellate intervention was not lowered in 
the instant case with respect to the crime of rape.  Arguably, the 
Trial Chamber’s factual findings were reasonable, and appellate 
intervention was thus unwarranted. 
¶9 It is noteworthy that the Tribunal has previously established 
a high threshold of caution with respect to relying on circumstan-
tial evidence.26  The Trial Chamber’s approach appears to have met 
                                                 
23 Muhimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 4, Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Schomburg ¶ 3. 
24 Id. ¶ 2. 
25 In other words, if the evidence showed that Muhimana took the victims to the 
house, and that witnesses heard the victims crying and blaming Muhimana prior 
to their murder, and later Muhimana was seen taking out the victim’s bodies, it 
is not clear whether the Chamber would have questioned Muhimana’s specific 
role in the murders (e.g., whether he is the one who personally struck the victims 
to death). 
26 In a subsequent judgment, Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶ 906 (Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Media Appeals Judg-
ment], the Appeals Chamber held that in order to ground a conviction on the 
basis of circumstantial evidence, the only reasonable inference to draw from 
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this threshold, and its findings do not appear to have been errone-
ous.  Arguably, the evidence in relation to the rape of the two vic-
tims involved both direct and circumstantial evidence that was 
credible, detailed and consistent, and no reasonable doubt could be 
entertained by a trier of fact that Muhimana raped the two victims.  
It is arguable that several of the facts adduced actually constitute 
direct evidence: that Muhimana brought the victims to his house; 
that the victims cried out mentioning Muhimana’s name and stat-
ing that they did not expect him to “do that” to them; that Muhi-
mana led the victims out of the house stark naked; and that they 
were then seen leaving the house walking with their legs apart.  
Arguably, the more indirect or circumstantial evidence relates to 
whether Muhimana personally ‘penetrated’ the victims.  Even in 
relation to the latter category of evidence, it was reasonable for the 
Trial Chamber to consider the circumstantial evidence in a holistic 
way, and find that Muhimana personally raped the victims.  The 
Appeals Chamber’s concern that a person other than Muhimana 
may have raped the victims appears to ignore the fact that the vic-
tims screamed out questioning why Muhimana had done “it” to 
them. In the circumstances, “it” could reasonably be construed to 
refer to rape.27  The rest of AP’s testimony (e.g., that Muhimana 
took the victims to his own house and that after the alleged rape he 
led them out of the house, stark naked, and that they were walking 
with their legs apart), holistically examined, points to the only rea-
sonable conclusion: that Muhimana himself raped the victims. 
B. The Scope of Commission as a Mode of Criminal 
Participation: Commission Through the Instrumentality of Others 
¶10 It may be argued that even assuming doubt could be 
entertained that Muhimana personally raped the victims (and thus 
                                                                                                             
such evidence must be that the accused was guilty of the crime in question.  An 
analysis of the Media Appeals Chamber judgment as it relates to the crime of 
conspiracy to commit genocide is addressed infra in Part V, but some aspects of 
the analysis are equally relevant to the issues being addressed with respect to the 
Appeals Chamber’s reversal of the rape count.  The Media Appeals Judgment is 
in French, and at the time of writing this article, the author relied on a draft Eng-
lish translation. 
27 As argued below, even assuming the victims were blaming him for the rapes 
committed by others, in the circumstances of the case, those other perpetrators 
acted as Muhimana’s ‘instruments,’ and therefore Muhimana was culpable for 
committing the rapes. 
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could not be held liable for ‘personal commission’), it was open for 
the Chamber to find that Muhimana committed the rape of the vic-
tims through the instrumentalities of others.  Such a finding could 
legitimately be made regardless of whether it was actually Muhi-
mana who had personally raped the victims.  The Appeals Cham-
ber’s jurisprudence in the Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment28 supports 
that view, and the material facts in Muhimana are similar to those 
in the Gacumbitsi case, notwithstanding that the criminal conduct 
in Gacumbitsi was killings (in support of the charge of genocide), 
while in Muhimana it was rape (in support of the charge of crime 
against humanity).   
¶11 In Gacumbitsi, the evidence presented during trial was that 
the Accused personally killed one victim (Mr. Murefu) at Nyaru-
buye Church, but he was found guilty for committing genocide in 
relation to the massacres of tens of thousands of other victims; 
those massacres were perpetrated by other assailants at the same 
church immediately following Gacumbitsi’s killing of Murefu.  In 
finding that Gacumbitsi was culpable for ‘committing’ genocide in 
relation to the massacres at the church (other than mere instigating 
or ordering the massacres), the Appeals Chamber explained as fol-
lows: 
As the Trial Chamber observed, the term ‘commit-
ted’ in Article 6(1) of the Statute has been held to 
refer ‘generally to the direct and physical perpetra-
tion of the crime by the offender himself.’ In the 
context of genocide, however, ‘direct and physical 
perpetration’ need not mean physical killing; other 
acts can constitute direct participation in the actus 
reus of the crime.  Here, the accused was physically 
present at the scene of the Nyarubuye Parish massa-
cres, which he ‘directed’ and ‘played a leading role 
in conducting and, especially supervising.’  It was 
he who personally directed the Tutsi and Hutu refu-
gees to separate – and that action, which is not ade-
quately described by any other mode of Article 6(1) 
liability, was as much an integral part of the geno-
cide as were the killings which it enabled.  More-
                                                 
28 Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 60; see also id. Separate Opin-
ion of Judge Shahabuddeen ¶ 24. 
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over, these findings of fact were based on allega-
tions that were without question clearly pleaded in 
the Indictment. 
The Appeals Chamber is persuaded that in the cir-
cumstances of this case, the modes of liability used 
by the Trial Chamber to categorize this conduct – 
‘ordering’ and ‘instigating’ – do not, taken alone, 
fully capture the Appellant’s criminal responsibility.  
The Appellant did not simply ‘order’ or ‘plan’ 
genocide from a distance and leave it to others to 
ensure that his orders and plans were carried out; 
nor did he merely ‘instigate’ the killings.  Rather, he 
was present at the crime scene to supervise and di-
rect the massacre, and participated in it actively by 
separating the Tutsi refugees so that they could be 
killed.  The Appeals Chamber finds by majority, 
Judge Güney dissenting, that this constitutes ‘com-
mitting’ genocide.29 
Muhimana’s role in the rapes of the victims (even assuming he did 
not physically rape either of the two victims), does not substan-
tially differ from Gacumbitsi’s role in the massacres at Nyarubuye 
Church.  In Muhimana, it was not in dispute that Muhimana took 
the victims to his own house, where they were raped, and his role 
was not merely passive, given that he was present throughout the 
victims’ ordeal.  After their rape, Muhimana led the victims out of 
the house, stark naked and they were walking with their legs apart. 
Muhimana thus played a critical or leading role in the rapes.  Even 
assuming he raped no one, Muhimana created the conditions under 
which the victims were raped, and/or set in motion their rape, and 
he was present throughout their ordeal, arguably to ensure that the 
rapes were carried out.  After ensuring that the victims were raped, 
it was Muhimana who drove the victims out of his house stark na-
ked and invited Interahamwe and other civilians to come and see 
what naked Tutsi girls looked like.  Muhimana then directed the 
Interahamwe to part the girls’ legs to provide onlookers with a 
clear view of the girls’ private parts.  Thus, even assuming Muhi-
mana did not personally rape the victims, whoever physically car-
                                                 
29 Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 60-61. 
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ried out the rapes, acted as his instrument.  Indisputably there was 
an “immediacy of relationship between the accused and the result 
of his action.”30  In these circumstances, proof that Muhimana per-
sonally raped the victims was not required to show “‘the direct and 
physical perpetration of the crime by the offender himself.’  To 
hold the contrary [would] be too narrow.”31  Once the above tests 
or requirements are met, the nature of the charge or crime is imma-
terial—in Muhimana, the fact that the crime at issue was rape is an 
irrelevant consideration.  As explained by Judge Shahabuddeen, 
“even in relation to the charge of genocide by ‘killing members of 
the group,’ the ‘direct and physical perpetration’ test can be ful-
filled even if it is not proved that the appellant himself killed any-
one.”32 The same principle should apply even if the crime in ques-
tion is rape. 
C. The Concepts of Lesser Included or Subsumed Crimes or 
Modes of Criminal Participation and Re-qualification of Crimes 
¶12 Turning to the Appeals Chamber’s holding that although 
Muhimana’s conduct could be characterized as aiding and abetting 
the rapes of the two victims, he could not be so held culpable be-
cause the indictment did not specifically plead that mode of liabil-
ity, issues arise as to whether the Appeals Chamber was not unduly 
strict.  Could the Chamber have drawn some inspiration from some 
national systems which tend to view aiding and abetting as being 
‘subsumed’ or ‘encompassed’ within the primary crime?  More-
over, was it open for the Chamber to find that, while Muhimana 
was charged with “committing rape” on the basis of the material 
facts pleaded in the indictment and the evidence adduced during 
trial, he was nevertheless culpable of ‘aiding and abetting’ the 
rape? Or alternatively, could Muhimana be found culpable for 
‘committing’ a re-characterized crime, for instance the crime 
against humanity of an ‘other inhumane act’? 
¶13 It is noteworthy that the constitutive Statute of the ICTR, like 
that of the ICTY, incorporates criminal offences and modes of 
criminal liability in separate provisions.  Articles 2 to 4 incorporate 
the crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes), 
while Articles 6(1) and 6(3) enshrine modes of criminal participa-
                                                 
30 Id. Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen ¶ 24. 
31 Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 60). 
32 Id. 
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tion, that is to say, the methods by which the crimes in Article 2 to 
4 may be perpetrated.33  These methods are committing, planning, 
ordering and aiding and abetting, as well as command or superior 
responsibility for crimes committed by one’s subordinates, if the 
superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinates were 
about to commit or had committed the crimes, but failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to pun-
ish the perpetrators thereof.  Thus, aiding and abetting (like other 
modes of participation above) is enshrined not as a ‘lesser or re-
lated’ crime (as is the case in some national jurisdictions34), but as 
a separate and distinct mode of criminal liability.  Prior to the pe-
riod under review, existing jurisprudence of the ICTR, like that of 
the ICTY, has required that an indictment should plead with speci-
ficity not only the crimes, but also the specific mode of criminal 
responsibility by which an accused is alleged to have perpetrated 
or participated in the crime.35  The ICTR jurisprudence explains the 
reason for requiring such specificity in pleading as being the need 
to ensure that an accused has adequate notice of the charges 
against him to enable him to prepare his defense.36  Failure to do 
so, for instance, by lifting the entire provisions of Article 6(1) 
without identifying in which particular mode of liability the ac-
cused is alleged to have engaged, may cause ambiguity, which may 
prejudice the rights of the accused just mentioned.37  Existing Tri-
bunal jurisprudence therefore holds that unless a defect in the in-
dictment is cured by the post-indictment communication of clear, 
consistent and timely information, a failure to plead the mode of 
criminal participation (like the material facts underpinning the 
crime) may be fatal.38   
                                                 
33 In Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, the Appeals Chamber held generally that 
these modes of participation apply to all the crimes in Article 2 to 4 of the Stat-
ute.  Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 546 
(Dec. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment]. 
34 See infra notes 39-41.  
35 Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 33, ¶¶ 469-476 (also invoking 
the ICTY’s Judgments in Kupreskic Appeals Judgment, supra note 22, and 
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, (Sept. 17, 
2003)). 
36 Id. ¶¶ 12, 470.  For a similar position at the ICTY, see Kupreskic Appeals 
Judgment, supra note 22, ¶¶ 88-89. 
37 Id. ¶ 473 (citing with approval the ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment in 
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 319 
(Mar. 24, 2000)). 
38 As noted above, the ICTR jurisprudence justifies the requirement of specific-
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¶14 It follows that Tribunal jurisprudence does not endorse the 
approach coming from some national jurisdictions which, once 
proven that an accused is responsible for a crime, does not require 
detailed account of the manner in which an accused participated in 
the crime.39  As well, Tribunal jurisprudence does not follow the 
approach from some national jurisdictions where once a primary 
offence is properly charged, a conviction for a lesser and/or related 
offence may follow if the evidence adduced supports that offense.  
For instance, in the United States federal criminal case U.S. v. 
Moore,40 the accused was charged for possession of a firearm.  Al-
though the accused was not charged as an aider and abettor, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was unnecessary that 
the indictment specifically charge aiding and abetting.  The Federal 
Court of Justice of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof) endorses a simi-
lar approach.  In a recent case, the Court has held that while there 
was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for drug traffick-
                                                                                                             
ity in pleading modes of criminal responsibility because of the need to ensure 
that an accused has adequate notice of the charges against him to enable him to 
prepare his defense. See, e.g., Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 33, 
¶¶ 12, 470.  For the ICTY, see e.g. Kupreskic Appeals Judgment, supra note 22, 
¶¶ 88-89. According to the jurisprudence, given that Article 6(1) of the ICTR’s 
Statute (like Article 7(1) of the ICTY’s Statute) enshrines different modes of 
criminal responsibility (namely, planning, instigating, ordering, committing, and 
aiding and abetting), if the indictment merely lifts the entire provisions of Arti-
cle 6(1) without identifying the particular mode of liability, ambiguity arises, 
and such ambiguity may prejudice the right of the accused to be informed in 
order to properly prepare his defense.  See Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment, 
supra note 33, ¶ 473 (citing the ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment in Prosecutor 
v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 319 (Mar. 24, 
2000)).  
39 See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 421 (5th ed. 2006) 
(describing modes of criminal responsibility in relation to English law). 
40 In U.S. v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1526-1527 (7th Cir. 1991), the court ex-
plained as follows: “The aiding and abetting charge under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) need 
not be specifically pleaded and a defendant indicted for a substantive offense 
can be convicted as an aider and abettor upon a proper demonstration of proof so 
long as no unfair surprise results.  If the trial court determines that the evidence 
warrants an aiding and abetting instruction, it is immaterial, although preferable, 
whether 18 U.S.C. § 2 is actually charged in the indictment.  An aider is punish-
able as a principal.” Id. at 1526 (citations and quotations omitted).  The Court 
went on to observe: “it is well established that a defendant need not be charged 
separately with aiding and abetting for that theory of liability to be presented to 
the jury, so long as the evidence warrants the instruction and no unfair surprise 
results . . . .  Moreover, because aiding and abetting does not constitute a sepa-
rate crime, all indictments are to be read as if the alternative provided by the 
aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, is included therein.” (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
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ing on the basis of the evidence adduced, a conviction for aiding 
and abetting the crime could be substituted.41  The German Court 
also did not reduce the sentence imposed, notwithstanding the sub-
stituted conviction. 
¶15 It is arguable that during the period under review, and more 
specifically in Muhimana, it was open for the Appeals Chamber to 
further develop the law by drawing some inspiration from the ju-
risprudence from national jurisdictions like those mentioned above.  
Notwithstanding that the ICTR Statute, like that of the ICTY, en-
shrines crimes and modes of criminal participation in separate pro-
visions, this should not close the doors for the Tribunal to draw 
such inspiration from national jurisdictions.  Indeed, given that a 
critical criterion in determining whether a defect in an indictment 
is fatal or whether it has been cured is whether an accused suffered 
prejudice, or whether the trial was rendered unfair by the defect,42 
doors are open to a Chamber to closely address matters of pleading 
on a case-by-case basis.  In Muhimana, despite the fact that the in-
dictment was limited to the charge of “committing rape,” based on 
the facts pleaded in the indictment, and the evidence adduced dur-
ing trial, two additional options43 were arguably available to the 
Chamber.  First, the facts pleaded in the indictment support an aid-
ing and abetting charge, and the Chamber could re-characterize or 
re-qualify the mode of criminal participation as such without an 
additional factual allegation.  On the basis of the facts pleaded in 
the indictment, the Accused would not have suffered prejudice by 
such re-qualification.  For instance, it was clear from paragraph 7 
of the indictment that it was the Accused who brought the victims 
to his house.  After the rape, he drove the victims out of the house 
stark naked and invited Interahamwe and other civilians to come 
and see what naked Tutsi girls looked like.  He then directed the 
Interahamwe to part the girls’ legs to provide on lookers with a 
clear view of the girls’ private parts.  These material facts were 
pleaded in the indictment and the Accused was provided all the 
opportunity to dispute these charges in addition to disputing that he 
personally raped the victims.  The Accused would thus arguably 
have not been prejudiced if the Chamber had re-qualified the mode 
                                                 
41 BGH 2 StR 516/06 (28 February 2007).  
42 Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 33, ¶ 27. 
43 As argued supra, the other option available was to find that the Accused 
committed the rape. 
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of criminal participation.  The situation would have been different 
(and the Accused would likely have been prejudiced) if the mate-
rial facts pleaded were very brief or generalized.  Such would have 
been the case, for instance, if the indictment merely pleaded that 
‘on or about 7 April 1994 at Gishyita sector Muhimana raped two 
victims in his home,’ without providing the other details enshrined 
in paragraph 7 of the indictment.  However, paragraph 7 of the in-
dictment laid down clear and detailed material particulars that at 
the very least supported a finding of aiding and abetting the crime 
of rape. 
¶16 The other option available to the Chamber was to re-qualify 
as the crime against humanity of an ‘other inhumane act.’  Some of 
the facts pleaded in paragraph 7 of the indictment could likely also 
have sustained this crime.  Again, on the basis of the same facts 
summarized above as pleaded in paragraph 7 of the indictment, the 
Accused would not suffer prejudice by the re-qualification because 
the indictment provided him with sufficient notice of the material 
facts and the opportunity to dispute those facts.  Arguably, by fail-
ing to pursue these alternative options in the particular circum-
stances of Muhimana, during the period under review, the Appeals 
Chamber undercut its contribution to the evolution of international 
criminal law. 
¶17  
III. EXTERMINATION AS CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY: CAN AN 
ACCUSED BE CULPABLE IF HE DID NOT PERSONALLY MURDER THE 
VICTIMS? ARE ALTERNATIVE CONVICTIONS PERMISSIBLE? 
¶18 According to existing Tribunal jurisprudence prior to the 
period under review, as well as that of the ICTY, “the crime of ex-
termination requires proof that the accused participated in a wide-
spread or systematic killing or in subjecting a widespread number 
of people or systematically subjecting a number of people to condi-
tions of living that would inevitably lead to death, and that the ac-
cused intended by his acts or omissions this result.”44  During the 
period under review, in the case of Ndindabahizi v. Prosecutor,45 
                                                 
44 Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 33, ¶ 522; Gacumbitsi Appeals 
Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 86.  For the ICTY, see Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. 
IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 259, 260 (March 22, 2006) [hereinafter 
Stakic Appeals Judgment]. 
45 Case No. ICTR-01-71-A, Appeals Judgment (Jan. 16, 2007) [hereinafter 
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the Appeals Chamber (Judge Güney dissenting) addressed whether 
an accused can be culpable of committing extermination if he did 
not personally murder the victims.   
¶19 In Ndindabahizi, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that the Accused was culpable for the commis-
sion of extermination in circumstances which showed that he did 
not physically kill the victims, but found that it was impermissible 
for the Trial Chamber to at the same time alternatively find the ac-
cused culpable of instigating and of aiding and abetting the crime 
of extermination.  It is noteworthy that the evidence admitted dur-
ing trial showed that the Accused had not physically killed anyone, 
but had instead transported attackers to the massacre scene, pro-
vided them with weapons and encouraged them to kill the Tutsi.  
On the basis of this evidence, the Trial Chamber found that:  
[T]he Accused himself committed the crime of ex-
termination.  He participated in creating, and con-
tributed to the conditions for the mass killing of 
Tutsi on Gitwa Hill on 26 April 1994, by distribut-
ing weapons, transporting attackers, and speaking 
words of encouragement that would have reasona-
bly appeared to give official approval for an attack.  
Alternatively, the Chamber finds that by these 
words and deeds, the Accused directly and substan-
tially contributed to the crime of extermination 
committed by the attackers at Gitwa Hill, and is 
thereby guilty of both instigating, and of aiding and 
abetting, that crime.46  
In relation to finding the Accused culpable of the crime on the ba-
sis of alternative modes of criminal participation, the Appeals 
Chamber found that approach impermissible, because it creates 
ambiguity as regards the scope of the Accused’s criminal responsi-
bility.  The Appeals Chamber explained as follows: 
                                                                                                             
Ndindabahizi Appeals Judgment]. 
46 Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. 01-71-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 485 (Trial 
Chamber I, July 15, 2004) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Ndindabahizi Trial 
Judgment]. 
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While an accused can be convicted for a single 
crime on the basis of several modes of liability, al-
ternative convictions for several modes of liability 
are, in general, incompatible with the principle that 
a judgment has to express unambiguously the scope 
of the convicted person’s criminal responsibility.  
This principle requires, inter alia, that the sentence 
corresponds to the totality of guilt incurred by the 
convicted person.  This totality of guilt is deter-
mined by the actus reus and the mens rea of the 
convicted person.  The modes of liability may either 
augment (e.g., commission of the crime with direct 
intent) or lessen (e.g., aiding and abetting a crime 
with awareness that a crime will probably be com-
mitted) the gravity of the crime.  Thus the criminal 
liability of a convicted person has to be established 
unequivocally.47 
With regard to the Trial Chamber’s finding that the Accused 
‘committed’ extermination, however, the Appeals Chamber (Judge 
Güney dissenting), upheld it, but offered limited analysis of the 
Trial Chamber’s approach, apart from stating, in a footnote, as fol-
lows: 
The Trial Chamber stated that ‘[e]xtermination may 
be committed less directly than murder, as by par-
ticipating in measures intended to bring about the 
deaths of a large number of individuals, but without 
actually committing a killing of any person’ (Trial 
Judgment, para. 479).  The words ‘without actually 
committing a killing’ could mean in the ordinary 
sense of the word, ‘without causing death.’ The Ap-
peals Chamber finds, however, that the words ‘ac-
tually’ in this context rather describes what other 
judgments have referred to as ‘indirectly’ causing 
death, in particular as these judgments are referred 
to in para. 479 of the Trial Judgment: Krstić Trial 
Judgment, para. 498; Vasiljevic Trial Judgment, 
                                                 
47 Ndindabahizi Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, ¶ 122. 
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para. 227; Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judg-
ment, paras. 143, 146.48 
The issue arising from the Appeals Chamber’s approach is whether 
it is legally correct to hold an accused culpable for committing ex-
termination if he did not physically, with his own hands, kill any-
one.  According to Judge Güney, such a conviction cannot be sus-
tained.  Judge Güney criticized the majority for upholding the Trial 
Chamber’s finding (that the Appellant was liable for committing 
extermination) without assessing the correctness of the Trial 
Chamber’s approach on the evidence.49  Judge Güney argued that 
the actions of the Appellant could not amount to commission, as 
the Accused had not physically killed anyone.  It was the assailants 
who the Appellant had transported, given weapons and encouraged 
to kill, that committed extermination, and not the Appellant.50 
Judge Güney concluded that the Appellant could only be held cul-
pable for instigating and aiding and abetting extermination.51  In 
addition, Judge Güney noted that the Appellant’s actions could not 
amount to creating the conditions of living that would inevitably 
lead to the death of a large number of victims as to amount to ex-
termination, and moreover, “it cannot be maintained that the kill-
ing of the refugees at Gitwa Hill would have occurred without the 
actions of the attackers themselves.”52 
¶20 The failure by the Appeals Chamber to provide detailed 
elaboration as to why the Appellant’s actions amounted to the 
commission of extermination undercuts its contribution to the evo-
lution of international criminal law.  The Appeals Chamber pro-
vided no elaboration as to the scope of an important way in which 
accused persons may participate in extermination, namely, by “sys-
tematically subjecting a number of people to conditions of living 
that would inevitably lead to death.”53  Arguably many forms of 
actus reus are embraced by this.   
                                                 
48 Id. n.268. 
49 Id. Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Güney ¶ 2.  
50 Id. ¶ 5. 
51 Id. Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Güney ¶ 2. 
52 Id. ¶ 3.  
53 Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 33, ¶ 522; Gacumbitsi Appeals 
Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 86.  For the ICTY, see Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. 
IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 259, 260 (Mar. 22, 2006). 
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¶21 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber’s position, like the position 
taken by the Trial Chamber in the same case, appears to be under-
pinned by the approach taken by the majority in the Gacumbitsi 
Appeals Judgment, namely, that ‘committing’ encompasses not 
only physically perpetrating the actus reus of the crime, or partici-
pating in a joint criminal enterprise, but also other forms of crimi-
nal participation, including an accused’s use of the instrumentality 
of others. Unfortunately, the Ndindabahizi Appeals Judgment fails 
to provide elaboration.  Judge Güney criticizes the majority’s ap-
parent reliance on the Gacumbitsi approach just mentioned, ob-
serving that their approach 
[b]lurs the essential distinction between ‘commit-
ting’ a crime and other forms of liability recognized 
by the [ICTR] Statute and the jurisprudence.  If any 
act of participation in a crime amounts to commit-
ting a crime, then all modes of liability are sub-
sumed in the expression ‘committed’ in Article 6(1) 
of the Statute and becomes redundant.  This, at the 
very least, runs contrary to the principle of ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat, according to which all 
provisions in the Statute should be given effect.54 
As argued above (in relation to the Appeals Chamber’s approach to 
the crime of rape in Muhimana), in situations where an accused’s 
criminal participation may not adequately be described or captured 
by any of the modes of criminal participation in Article 6(1) (such 
as was the situation in Gacumbitsi), or where an accused employs 
the instrumentality of others to perpetrate crimes,55 it may be le-
gally correct to find that the accused ‘committed’ a crime under the 
Tribunal’s Statute.  The concern expressed by Judge Güney (of 
blurring the distinction between commission and other forms of 
criminal participation) is noteworthy, but such blurring could be 
avoided in a specific case if the Chambers examine each case on its 
                                                 
54 Ndindabahizi Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, Partially Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Güney ¶ 4.  According to the Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, the 
principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat requires that it is better for a thing 
(such as the provisions of the law) to have effect than to be made void, citing the 
English case of Roe v. Tranmarr, (1757) Willes, R. 682.  OSBORN’S CONCISE 
LAW DICTIONARY 336 (7th ed. 1983). 
55 Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 60-61 & Separate Opinion of 
Judge Shahabuddeen ¶ 24. 
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merits.  Such case-by-case examination would assist the Chambers 
to determine whether in a given case, the accused’s criminal con-
duct is inadequately captured by other modes of criminal participa-
tion other than commission, or whether his criminal conduct tran-
scended those modes of criminal responsibility (for instance where 
an accused uses those who physically carried out the crime as his 
instruments) so as to constitute commission.   
¶22 It is argued that the Appeals Chamber’s approach in 
Gacumbitsi in relation to when an accused’s criminal participation 
amounts to commission, notwithstanding that the Accused did not 
physically perpetrate the crime or participated in a joint criminal 
enterprise, is not intended to lay a ‘fixed’ rule which is only appli-
cable if all the facts in Gacumbitsi are met (for instance, when an 
accused is present at the scene of the crime and participates in di-
recting the crimes).  Instead, whether or not the Gacumbtsi thresh-
old is met, is to be a case-by-case determination.  Depending on 
the circumstances of a given case, even if an accused was not pre-
sent at the massacre scene to direct the perpetration of the crimes, 
it does not automatically follow that the Gacumbtsi threshold is not 
met.  Arguably, in Ndindabahizi, the Appeals Chamber could have 
considered, inter alia, the role the Accused’s criminal conduct 
played in ensuring that the massacres were perpetrated, as well as 
his status in the community vis-à-vis the assailants who physically 
carried out the massacres,56 in determining whether the assailants 
were merely the instruments that the Accused employed to perpe-
trate the crime of extermination.  In upholding the Trial Chamber’s 
finding that the Accused committed extermination, the Appeals 
Chamber should have elaborated its reasoning on whether the Ac-
cused’s criminal conduct constituted either the creation or the sub-
jection of victims to conditions of living that inevitably led to their 
death, or criminal conduct that transcended mere instigation and 
aiding and abetting of the crime and thus constituted commission.   
                                                 
56 Arguably, these factors may, for instance, assist in assessing to what extent 
the accused could direct the perpetrators to implement his will, as was the case 
in the Gacumbitsi case.  Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 60-61. 
It is argued that the capacity of an accused to give directions to perpetrators 
(combined with other factors, such as the first one, i.e., the role played by the 
accused’s criminal conduct in perpetrating the crimes) may go a long way in 
demonstrating that the accused used the instrumentalities of others to perpetrate 
crimes.  In the instant case, the Accused held positions of leadership both at the 
local and national level, and thus he could give directions to broad categories of 
the population.   
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IV. THE CRIME OF DIRECT AND PUBLIC INCITEMENT TO COMMIT 
GENOCIDE VIS-À-VIS HATE SPEECH: IS THE CRIME A CONTINUOUS 
OFFENSE? 
¶23 During the period under review, the Appeals Chamber also 
addressed for the first time in detail the contours of the crime of 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide.  The Appeals 
Chamber particularly addressed the manner in which the crime re-
lates to the use of public media.  Prior to that, the existing jurispru-
dence was from trial chambers, notably the Media Trial Judgment.  
Importantly, the Media Appeals Judgment examined the relation-
ship between hate speech and genocide.  Because the Appellants in 
the Media case did not impugn the Trial Chamber’s approach to 
the notion of ‘public,’ which forms part of the definition of the 
crime,57 the Media Appeals Judgment concentrated on the notions 
of ‘direct incitement.’   
¶24 With respect to the ‘direct’ element of the crime of incite-
ment to commit genocide, the Appeals Chamber upheld existing 
trial chamber jurisprudence58 and drew inspiration from the Muge-
sera decision of the Supreme Court of Canada,59 holding that direct 
incitement to commit genocide assumes that the speech is a direct 
                                                 
57 The Trial Chamber in the ‘media case’ addressed the crime of direct and pub-
lic incitement to commit genocide. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-
52-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 978-1039 (Trial Chamber I, May 12, 2003) 
[hereinafter Media Trial Judgment]. With respect to the elements of the crime, 
the Chamber generally referred to an earlier Judgment, the Akayesu Trial Cham-
ber Judgment, supra note 6.  Citing the approach taken in civil law systems, 
Akayesu observed that words would be ‘public’ if they were spoken aloud in a 
place that were public in nature.  Id. ¶ 556.  In determining whether the ‘public’ 
element of the crime is met, Akayesu holds that two factors are pertinent, 
namely: the place where the incitement occurred, and whether or not assistance 
was selective or limited. Id.  Also invoking the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996), the 
Trial Chamber held that “‘public’ incitement is characterized by a call for crimi-
nal action to a number of people in a public place or to members of the general 
public at large by such means as the mass media, for example, radio or televi-
sion.” Id.  According to Akayesu, “[a]t the time the Convention on Genocide was 
adopted, the delegates specifically agreed to rule out the possibility of including 
private incitement to commit genocide as a crime, thereby underscoring their 
commitment to set aside for punishment only the truly public forms of incite-
ment.” Id. 
58 See Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, ¶ 692 (citing Prosecutor v. Ka-
jeljeili, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment, ¶ 852 (Trial Chamber II, Dec. 1, 
2003); Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 6, ¶ 557). 
59 Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] S.C.R. 
100, 2005 SCC 40, ¶ 87 (Can.). 
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appeal to commit an act referred to in Article 2(2) of the Statute; 
the speech has to be more than a mere vague or indirect sugges-
tion.60  
¶25 With respect to the contours of the crime, the Media Appeals 
Judgment explains that while in most cases the crime is preceded 
or accompanied by hate speech, an accused cannot be guilty of the 
crime for hate speech that does not directly call for the commission 
of genocide.61 Thus, unlike the Media Trial Judgment, which ex-
tensively cited hate speech jurisprudence from the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights as 
useful guides regarding the factors to be considered in defining the 
elements of the crime as applied to mass media, the Media Appeals 
Judgment itself specified the limits of hate speech jurisprudence.  
Thus, to the extent that not all hate speech constitutes direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide, the jurisprudence on in-
citement to hatred and discrimination (i.e., hate speech) is not di-
rectly applicable in determining what constitutes direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide.62 
¶26 Like the existing jurisprudence from trial chambers, the 
Appeals Chamber in the ‘media case’ explained that to determine 
whether speech constitutes direct (and public) incitement to com-
mit genocide (and to distinguish it from other forms of speech such 
as hate speech), the exercise is a case-by-case determination that 
must take account of the context and language of the people in the 
society in question.63  The rationale for that exercise is to assess 
how the intended audience understood a given speech.  Thus, the 
key consideration is the meaning of the words used in the specific 
context, such that even if the message in question seems equivocal 
to another audience in a different society or context, that is of little 
relevance.64  It follows that if the speech is still equivocal even 
when considered in its context, it cannot constitute the crime of 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide.65 
¶27 The Appeals Chamber in the Media Appeals Judgment, 
however, rejected existing trial chamber jurisprudence holding that 
                                                 
60 Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, ¶ 692. 
61 Id. ¶ 693. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. ¶ 700. 
64 Id. ¶ 701. 
65 Id. 
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incitement is a continuous crime which continues in time until the 
completion of the acts contemplated.66  Instead, the Appeals 
Chamber emphasized that the crime is an inchoate offense (crime 
formel in civil law) which is completed by the use of the means or 
process aimed at producing a harmful effect, irrespective of 
whether that effect is produced.67  The Appeals Chamber further 
noted that the crime is completed as soon as the accused’s envis-
aged statements are made or published, even if the effects of the 
incitement can extend in time.68  Nevertheless, in the context of the 
temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal (which limits the crimes to 
1994 only), the Appeals Chamber explained that although pre-
1994 speeches or broadcasts may not be the basis of a conviction, 
they may be relevant as contextual elements of the speeches or 
broadcast made in 1994.69  Such contextual elements may include a 
determination of how listeners perceived or understood the 
speeches or broadcasts made in 1994, and the impact such 
speeches or broadcasts may have had.70  However, based on Ap-
peals Chamber jurisprudence to date, it is not clear why an ac-
cused’s criminal conduct cannot be considered continuing if a pre-
1994 publication inciting genocide is maintained in public circula-
tion and is recited in 1994 with the accused’s knowledge and ac-
quiescence (and without him taking an action to retract it).  It may 
be argued that the Appeals Chamber in the Media Appeals Judg-
ment correctly rejects the Trial Chamber’s general statement of 
law that incitement is a continuous crime, which continues in time 
until the completion of the acts contemplated,71 because the inter-
pretation appears to contradict the inchoate nature of the crime.  
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the crime cannot be denied a 
continuing attribute, if the circumstances, such as the situation de-
scribed above,72 are proven on the evidence.  That situation argua-
bly meets the threshold delineating the concept of a continuing 
                                                 
66 That position had been taken by the Media Trial Judgment, supra note 57, ¶ 
1017. 
67 Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, ¶ 720. 
68 Id. ¶ 723. 
69 Id. ¶ 725. 
70 Id. 
71 That position had been taken by the Media Trial Judgment, supra note 57, ¶ 
1017 (emphasis added). 
72 That is to say, where an accused’s pre-1994 inflammatory publication is main-
tained in public circulation and is recited in 1994 with the accused’s knowledge 
and acquiescence (and without him taking any action to retract it). 
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crime as identified by the Media Appeals Judgment, and an ICTR 
accused in such a situation may be held culpable for the crime, 
notwithstanding that the inciting material initially was distributed 
prior to 1994.  According to the Chamber, a continuing crime im-
plies an ongoing criminal responsibility.73  The Black’s Law Dic-
tionary, also invoked by the Chamber,74 defines a continuing crime 
as “a crime that continues after an initial illegal act is consum-
mated; a crime that involves ongoing elements . . . .  A crime (such 
as driving a stolen vehicle) that continues over an extended period 
of time.”75  On the basis of this definition, while it is clear that in 
the context of the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction, an accused may be 
culpable for the crime if it is proven that during 1994, he re-
circulated a pre-1994 publication (as was the situation in the ‘me-
dia case’ where the accused were alleged to have re-circulated in 
1994 some pre-1994 issues of the Kangura newspaper that incited 
genocide76), the jurisprudence has yet to address whether an ac-
cused would be culpable if the inflammatory publication was re-
cited during 1994 with the accused’s knowledge and acquiescence 
(and without him taking an action to retract it).  
¶28 Another contentious aspect of the Media Appeals Judgment 
is its statement that “even if it could be concluded that all of the 
issues published in Kangura [newspaper] and the RTLM broad-
casts constituted a continuing incitement to commit genocide . . . , 
it would remain that the [Accused] would be convicted only for 
acts of direct and public incitement to commit genocide carried out 
in 1994.”77  Arguably, the Appeals Chamber very restrictively con-
strues the concept of ‘carrying out’ [a genocide-inciting publica-
                                                 
73 Id. ¶ 721. 
74 Id. 
75 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 399 (8th ed. 2004). 
76 It is noteworthy that the Media Trial Chamber found the accused culpable for 
the crime on the basis that the pre-1994 inflammatory issues had been brought 
back into circulation through a competition jointly organized by RTLM and 
Kangura in 1994.  On appeal, the Appeals Chamber quashed the conviction not 
because a ‘re-circulation’ of pre-1994 material cannot legally amount to publica-
tion of the material during 1994, but because, according to the Appeals Cham-
ber, the indictment had not pleaded that the Prosecutor would rely on the compe-
tition to support the crime—hence the indictment was defective.  As well, the 
Chamber considered that there was not enough evidence to show that the com-
petition had re-circulated all the pre-1994 issues of Kangura, or that those issues 
were available in 1994. See Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, ¶¶ 396-
410. 
77 Id. ¶ 724 (emphasis added). 
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tion], and also denies the crime a continuing attribute, regardless of 
whether the circumstances or the evidence show that the crime ful-
filled such an attribute.  The Chamber’s approach also tends to ig-
nore that in scenarios such as the one described supra,78 the ac-
cused may be held culpable for ‘commission’ of the crime by act-
ing through the instrumentality of others (in line with the position 
taken in the Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, supra), or for commis-
sion by omission (i.e., for failing to retract or withdraw from public 
circulation the inflammatory statement).  At the very least, the ac-
cused could be held culpable for tacitly encouraging others to re-
circulate or recite his inflammatory material—conduct that may 
fall within the scope of aiding and abetting the crime. 
¶29 Finally, during the period under review, the Media Appeals 
Judgment provided some elaboration with respect to the mens rea 
requirements of the crime of direct and public incitement to com-
mit genocide. The Appeals Chamber rejected an approach that 
would hold that once genocide in fact occurs, and is traceable from 
an accused’s direct and public incitement to commit genocide, that 
alone is sufficient demonstration of the intent to incite genocide.79  
The Appeals Chamber jurisprudence instead takes the same posi-
tion taken in trial chambers that proof of intent of the crime (like 
other crimes) must be holistic.  Thus, the fact that genocide actu-
ally occurred following an accused’s incitement may not be the 
only evidence adduced, but it can be some of the evidence to sup-
port proof of mens rea of the crime of direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide. 
                                                 
78 That is to say, where an accused maintains in public circulation his pre-1994 
inflammatory publication and the publication is recited in 1994 with the ac-
cused’s knowledge and acquiescence (and without him taking any action to re-
tract it). 
79 Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, ¶ 709.  Although not specifically at 
issue in the ‘media case,’ in line with the provisions of the ICTR’s Statute (in-
cluding Articles 1-6, which empower the Tribunal to prosecute any person(s) 
responsible for the crimes), individual responsibility is not restricted to any par-
ticular class of persons, or profession.  It follows that any person, whether or not 
he or she is a journalist, can be held individually culpable for the crime of direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide.  The same approach applies to other 
crimes falling within the ICTR’s jurisdiction.  In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case 
No. ICTR-96-4-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 438-446 (June 1, 2001), the Appeals 
Chamber confirmed that war crimes can be perpetrated by any person, regard-
less of whether he or she is a public agent (e.g., a member of government, army 
or a member of the other party to the armed conflict).    
2008]                                         GEORGE WILLIAM MUGWANYA                                                           
 
441
V. THE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT GENOCIDE: ELEMENTS 
AND PROOF BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE  
¶30 During the period under review, the Tribunal’s Media 
Appeals Judgment also elaborated the elements of the crime of 
conspiracy to commit genocide and dealt with issues relating to 
proving the crime on the basis of circumstantial evidence.  A ma-
jority of the judges reversed the conviction for conspiracy to com-
mit genocide that had been entered by the Trial Chamber, with 
Judge Shahabuddeen dissenting.  The jurisprudence engendered 
raises critical controversies. 
¶31 The Appeals Chamber reiterated the elements of the actus 
reus of the crime as spelled out in previous jurisprudence, namely, 
an agreement between two or more persons to commit the crime of 
genocide.80  The agreement need not be formal nor explicit (such 
that a tacit agreement can suffice), but the evidence must establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt an agreement and not mere similar con-
duct.81  Moreover, the Chamber reiterated the elements of the mens 
rea of the crime as established in previous jurisprudence: that the 
individual involved in the agreement to commit genocide must 
have the same intent required of genocide, namely the specific in-
tent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or re-
ligious group.82 
¶32 With respect to proof of the crime and the sufficiency of 
circumstantial evidence, the approach adopted by the Appeals 
Chamber in the Media Appeals Judgment is controversial.  Some 
controversies are similar to those identified in the Muhimana Ap-
peals Judgment in dealing with the crime of rape (see supra Part 
II.A).  Invoking common law jurisprudence from the jurisdictions 
of the United States, Canada and United Kingdom, the Appeals 
Chamber took the position that the actus reus of conspiracy to 
commit genocide is not equivalent to proof of “planning meetings” 
as the Appellants had argued, but it could be inferred from other 
evidence, in particular the conduct of the conspirators.83  The Ap-
peals Chamber upheld the legal position previously taken by the 
Trial Chamber in the ‘media case’: that conspiracies can be in-
                                                 
80 Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, ¶¶ 894, 896. 
81 Id. ¶ 898. 
82 Id. ¶ 894. 
83 Id. ¶ 896. 
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ferred from, among other interactions, the interaction among insti-
tutions conspirators control.  In so doing, the Tribunal affirmed the 
notion of institutional conspiracy.84 
¶33 However, it is noteworthy that the Appeals Chamber 
emphasized that proving conspiracy to commit genocide on the 
basis of circumstantial evidence (as was the situation in the ‘media 
case’), requires that a finding of a conspiracy to commit genocide 
be the only reasonable inference based on the totality of the evi-
dence.85  After reviewing the interaction among the Appellants and 
the institutions they controlled, the Appeals Chamber (by majority) 
reversed the conviction entered by the Trial Chamber.  In the Ap-
peals Chamber’s view, there was no reasonable doubt that the evi-
dence adduced during trial was compatible with the existence of a 
“joint agenda” aiming at committing genocide, but it was not the 
only reasonable inference.86  A reasonable trier of fact could also 
find that the institutions controlled by the defendants had inter-
acted to promote the “Hutu power” ideology in the context of a 
political struggle between Hutus and Tutsis, or to disseminate eth-
nic hatred against the Tutsis, without going as far as the destruc-
tion, in whole or in part, of that group.87 
¶34 The Media Appeals Judgment contains limited elaboration as 
to why appellate intervention in the Trial Chamber’s findings of 
fact was warranted given existing prior jurisprudence from the 
same Appeals Chamber, like that of the ICTY, to the effect that 
such intervention is only to occur in exceptional circumstances, 
namely, where no reasonable trier of fact could not have reached 
the same finding or where the finding is wholly erroneous.88  The 
judgment also contains limited elaboration as to how the Trial 
Chamber’s findings were unreasonable or wholly erroneous, and 
does not explain why the inference of conspiracy to commit geno-
cide was not the only ‘reasonable’ inference to be drawn from the 
evidence, or why the alleged alternative inferences were actually 
‘reasonable’ in the circumstances.  The existence, in a given situa-
tion, of other alternatives inferences or explanations (besides con-
spiracy to commit genocide) does not, per se, mean that conspiracy 
                                                 
84 Id. ¶ 907. 
85 Id. ¶¶ 897, 907. 
86 Id. ¶ 910. 
87 Id. ¶ 910. 
88 Muhimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 4, ¶ 8; Rutaganda Appeals Judg-
ment, supra note 19, ¶¶ 21-23. 
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cannot be the only reasonable inference (or that it cannot be estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt).  This is because the nature of 
all the alternative inferences or explanations—for instance, 
whether they are founded or reasonable in the circumstances—
must be taken into account.  In such a situation, it is the duty of a 
Trial Chamber to sort out those multiple explanations or inferences 
and on the basis of the evidence before it determine which of them, 
if any, is reasonable or founded.  The Media Appeals Judgment 
arguably fails to explain how the Trial Chamber erred in that exer-
cise as to justify appellate intervention.  Thus, even assuming other 
alternative inferences could also be drawn from the evidence, the 
judgment does not expound on how the inference of conspiracy to 
commit genocide was unreasonable or wholly erroneous.  
¶35 A close examination of the reasoning of the majority 
judgment seems to suggest that they quashed the Trial Chamber’s 
findings principally because in addition to conspiracy to commit 
genocide, there were other possible inferences or explanations 
about why the Accused might have collaborated.  Instead, the fo-
cus should have arguably been placed on whether there was proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy to commit genocide 
existed, notwithstanding other possible motivations for the Ac-
cused’s collaboration.  On a similar point, Judge Shahabuddeen 
expressed himself as follows: 
[T]here is a consideration concerning the limited 
thrust of an argument that, in addition to the princi-
ple that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt, in cases in which the evidence is purely cir-
cumstantial, the court must acquit unless facts are 
not only consistent with guilt but are also inconsis-
tent with any other rational explanation.  The prin-
ciple sought to be invoked by the argument does not 
stand in glorious independence of the principle that 
guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but 
is a consequence of the latter: if another explanation 
can with equal reason be drawn, it follows that guilt 
has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.  No 
doubt, the rule about there being another equally 
reasonable explanation is suitable (particularly if 
there is a jury) of applying the general rule about 
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reasonable doubt in some cases of circumstantial 
evidence, and it has been employed by the Tribunal; 
but it does not introduce a separate or more strin-
gent rule, being more a matter of form than of sub-
stance.89 
In addition, based on the judgment, it appears that the Appeals 
Chamber entertained no doubt that a conspiracy to commit geno-
cide on the part of the defendants existed, given the Chamber’s 
own statement that the evidence was compatible with a conspiracy 
to commit genocide, in addition to other alternative motivations.90  
On this point, in his partly dissenting opinion, Judge Shahabud-
deen argues as follows: 
[S]ince the Appeals Chamber had no ‘doubt’ that a 
genocidal purpose was ‘compatible’ with the ‘joint 
agenda’ of the appellants, the Appeals Chamber is 
to be taken to admit that there was evidence before 
the Trial Chamber on which it could reasonably 
hold that the purpose of their collaboration was to 
commit genocide.  The Appeals Chamber has no 
basis for disagreeing with the holding which the 
Trial Chamber proceeded to make on that evidence; 
that holding is not shown to have been unreason-
able.91 
As well, Judge Shahabuddeen doubts that the alleged “other alter-
native” motivations or purposes for the defendants’ collaboration 
were founded, or reasonable in the circumstances. According to 
him, 
[t]here seems to have been no argument before the 
Trial Chamber as to whether the aim of any collabo-
ration was the establishment of Hutu power by 
means short of genocide.  Paragraph 906 of the Ap-
peals Chamber Judgment does not suggest that there 
                                                 
89 Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, Partly dissenting opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen ¶ 63. 
90 Id. ¶ 910. 
91 Id. Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen ¶ 60.  
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was any such argument.  There was no such argu-
ment because the argument would imply that the 
appellants did collaborate in some matters – and this 
they stoutly denied.  Thus the argument that the aim 
of any collaboration was limited to the establish-
ment of Hutu power by non-genocidal means was 
not made.  In the result, the Appeals Chamber is 
without the benefit of the views of the parties or the 
Trial Chamber on the argument.92 
Thus, it is arguable that, similar to the Appeals Chamber’s reversal 
of one of the rape convictions in Muhimana, discussed supra in 
Part II, appellate intervention in the findings of the Trial Chamber 
in the ‘media case’ with respect to the count of conspiracy to com-
mit genocide was unwarranted. 
VI. PERSECUTION AS CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY: CAN HATE 
SPEECH SUFFICE? 
¶36 The Media Appeals Judgment also addressed for the first 
time in some detail the scope of persecution as a crime against hu-
manity when the underlying criminal acts of the accused are hate 
speech. 
¶37 Firstly, the Appeals Chamber, invoking existing jurispru-
dence from the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber, defined persecution as a 
crime against humanity as follows: 
[a]n act or omission which discriminates in fact and 
which denies or infringes upon a fundamental right 
laid down in international customary or treaty law 
(the actus reus); and was carried out deliberately 
with the intention to discriminate on one of the 
listed grounds, specifically race, religion or politics 
(the mens rea).  However, not every act of discrimi-
nation will constitute the crime of persecution: the 
underlying acts of persecution, whether considered 
in isolation or in conjunction with other acts must 
be of gravity equal to the crimes listed under Article 
3 of the Statute.  Furthermore, it is not necessary 
                                                 
92 Id. ¶ 61 (citations omitted). 
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that these underlying acts of persecution amount to 
crimes in international law.  Accordingly, there is 
no need to review here the Appellants’ arguments 
that mere hate speech does not constitute a crime 
under international criminal law.93 
While reiterating existing jurisprudence from the ICTY’s Appeals 
Chamber, that violations of human dignity through harassment, 
humiliation and psychological abuses, if sufficiently serious, can 
constitute acts of persecution,94 the Appeals Chamber confirmed 
that hate speech targeting a population on the basis of ethnicity, or 
any other discriminatory ground, violates the right to respect to 
dignity—a right recognized under the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights—of the members of the targeted group, and 
therefore constitutes “actual discrimination.”95  Moreover, speech 
inciting violence against a population on the basis of ethnicity or 
any other form of discriminatory ground was found to violate the 
right to security of the members of the targeted group and therefore 
also constitutes “actual discrimination.”96 
¶38 However, Appeals Chamber jurisprudence on the crime of 
persecution has not been fully developed.  In some instances the 
Chamber has clarified the scope of the crime and in other instances 
it has scaled it down, particularly when the underlying criminal act 
has been hate speech.  Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber’s juris-
prudence still leaves some issues unaddressed. 
¶39 Prior to the period under review, the trial chamber in the 
Media case had taken the broad position that hate speech per se is 
persecutory because it constitutes a deprivation of several rights, 
including the right to life, liberty and basic human dignity, and 
denigrates the victims by creating a lesser status for them in the 
                                                 
93 Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, ¶ 985 (citing, inter alia, the ICTY’s 
Appeals Judgments in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals 
Judgment, ¶ 185 (Sept. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-A, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶ 177 (Nov. 28, 2006); Stakic Appeals Judgment, supra note 
44, ¶¶ 327, 328; Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Ap-
peals Judgment, ¶ 101 (Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-
14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 131 (July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case 
No. IT-98-32-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 113 (Feb. 5, 2004); Prosecutor v. 
Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 296 (Apr. 3, 2007)). 
94 Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, ¶ 986. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. 
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eyes of the society.97  Such denigration “in and of itself, as well as 
on its other consequences, can be an irreversible harm.”98  On ap-
peal, however, the Appeals Chamber held that hate speech alone 
cannot amount to a violation of the right to life, freedom and 
physical integrity of the human being.99  Other requirements have 
to be met for such violation to materialize; “a speech cannot, in 
itself, directly kill members of the group, imprison or physically 
injure them.”100  Secondly, the Appeals Chamber declined to de-
cide whether hate speeches alone, that do not incite violence, are of 
gravity equal to other crimes against humanity, sufficient to consti-
tute acts of persecution.101  The Appeals Chamber justified declin-
ing to decide the issue on grounds that it is not necessary that every 
single underlying act of the crime of persecution be of gravity 
equal to the other crimes against humanity: underlying acts of per-
secution can be considered jointly, and it is the cumulative effect 
of all the underlying acts of the crime of persecution which must 
be of gravity equal to the other crimes against humanity.102  In ad-
dition, the Appeals Chamber noted that the context in which the 
underlying acts of persecution take place is also important in as-
sessing their gravity.103  
¶40 In the instant case, the Appeals Chamber concluded that hate 
speech made after 6 April 1994 met the requirement of gravity un-
derpinning persecution as a crime against humanity because it was 
accompanied by speech calling for genocide against the Tutsi 
group.  Moreover, all the speeches took place in the context of a 
vast campaign of persecution targeting Tutsis, a campaign that also 
included acts of violence (killings, ill-treatment, rapes).104 
¶41 While hate speech accompanied with violence is clearly 
persecutory, there is arguably no reason why hate speech unac-
companied by acts of violence may not, by itself, be persecutory.  
Given that such speech may not only expose the victims to dangers 
                                                 
97 Media Trial Judgment, supra note 57, ¶ 1072 (citing Prosecutor v. Ruggiue, 
Case No. ICTR 97-32-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 22 (Trial Chamber I, June 1, 
2000)). 
98 Id. 
99 Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 25, ¶ 986. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. ¶ 987. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. ¶ 988. 
 A T R O C I T Y  C R I M E S  L I T I G A T I O N  Y E A R - I N - R E V I E W        [Vol.  6  
 
448
(such as physical attacks from the population), but may also result 
in significant denigration and discrimination, such as the denial of 
access to employment and housing (which negatively impact other 
rights, such as the right to life105), arguably, the underlying act of 
hate speech, either by itself, or as part of a cumulative non-violent 
impact on a target group, can in certain circumstances be of a grav-
ity equal to the other crimes against humanity. 
VII. SPECIFICITY IN PLEADING: WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF CURES 
TO DEFECTIVE INDICTMENTS? 
¶42 Tribunal jurisprudence prior to the period under review, like 
that of the ICTY, has provided direction as to the pleading re-
quirements of indictments.  Based on Articles 18(4),106 21(2) and 
21(4)(a)-(b)107 of the Tribunal’s Statute, and Rule 47(c) of the Tri-
bunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence,108 the ICTR has stated 
that there is “an obligation on the part of the Prosecutor to state the 
material facts underpinning the charges in the indictment, but not 
                                                 
105 Human rights are interdependent, and the respect for, or denial of, one right 
may impact other rights.  See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 48th Sess., 22d plen. mtg., ¶ 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.157/243 (July 12, 1993).  With respect to the right to life guaran-
teed under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
of 1966, the U.N. Human Rights Committee (now Human Rights Council) has 
emphasized that the right is not to be restrictively construed, and therefore states 
are under an obligation to take multiple steps to address vices that may violate 
the right, such as malnutrition and epidemics.  See U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee, General Comment No. 6: The right to life (art. 6), ¶ 5, (Apr. 30, 1982), 
available at http:/www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.  In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mu-
nicipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545 (India), the judges underscored that the 
right to life is tempered not only by the execution of the death sentence, but also 
when one’s livelihood is interfered with.  The judges concluded that the eviction 
of the petitioners from the pavements and slums that they had set up near their 
places of employment deprived them of their livelihood, and consequently their 
right to life.  
106 The Article requires that an indictment must set out a concise statement of 
facts and the crime(s) with which the accused is charged. Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, available at http://www.un.org/ictr. 
107 Articles 21(2) and 21(4)(a)-(b) enshrine the rights of the accused to a fair 
hearing, to be informed of the nature of the charges against him and to have ade-
quate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense. Id. 
108 Rule 47 (c) requires that an indictment shall set out not only the name and 
particulars of the suspect, but also a concise statement of the facts of the case.  
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, available at http://www.un.org/ictr. 
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the evidence by which such material facts are to be proven.”109  
Moreover, while recognizing that an indictment is the cardinal 
charging instrument, Tribunal jurisprudence, like that from the 
ICTY, has held that in exceptional situations, if an indictment fails 
to meet the test of conciseness, such defect may be cured through 
the prosecutor’s consistent, clear and timely notification of infor-
mation to the accused by other means other than the indictment, 
such as through the pre-trial brief, disclosure of witness statements 
and other documents.110  
¶43 During the period under review, the Tribunal reiterated the 
same jurisprudence, including in Muhimana.111  However, in Mu-
himana, the Appeals Chamber addressed an interesting situation 
concerning the limits to ‘curing’ an indictment through the post-
indictment communications just mentioned.  In that case, the in-
dictment alleged that towards the end of May 1994 at Nyakiyabo 
hill, in the Bisesero area, the Accused ordered an Interahamwe 
(named Gisambo) to kill Mukarema.  However, the Prosecutor’s 
pre-trial brief and a witness statement attached to this brief some-
what modified this, alleging that the Accused actually murdered 
the victim in mid-May on another hill, in the Bisesero area.  On 
appeal, the Accused impugned his conviction by the Trial Chamber 
for this murder, alleging that the indictment did not give him 
proper notice of the time and place of the murder, or his role in it.  
As well, he challenged the variance between the indictment and the 
post-indictment communication.  The Accused contested the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that during trial, he did not object to the vari-
ance between the indictment and the post-indictment communica-
tions.112  It is noteworthy that according to the Trial Chamber, the 
Accused had challenged lack of notice in the indictment in relation 
to the time and place of the alleged murder, and not as to the nature 
of his role in that murder.113 
                                                 
109 Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 33, ¶ 25.  For the ICTY, see 
e.g. Kupreskic Appeals Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 88. 
110 See, e.g., Ntakirutimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 33, ¶ 27.  For the 
ICTY, see, e.g., Kupreskic Appeals Judgment, supra note 22, ¶¶117-120. 
111 Muhimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 4, ¶ 217. 
112 Id. ¶¶ 214-15, referring, inter alia, to Muhimana Trial Judgment, supra note 
5, ¶¶ 403, 404, 575.  
113 Muhimana Trial Judgment, supra note 5, ¶ 575.  It is important to note that 
the failure of the Accused to object at trial, as to the variances between the in-
dictment and post-indictment communications, at the time when the relevant 
evidence was adduced (like a failure in general to object to defects in the in-
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¶44 The Appeals Chamber, by majority, held that the indictment 
was defective, because, as established in previous jurisprudence, 
[w]here an accused is alleged to have personally 
committed a crime, the indictment must specify the 
criminal acts physically committed by the accused.  
An indictment lacking this precision is defective; 
however the defect may be cured if the Prosecution 
provides the accused with timely, clear and consis-
tent information detailing the factual basis under-
pinning the charge.114 
The indictment, concluded the majority, failed to allege the correct 
time and location of the murder, and that the Appellant had physi-
                                                                                                             
dictment), was not relevant as an admission as to the truthfulness of the post-
indictment communication.  Instead, in line with existing jurisprudence, such 
failure is relevant in determining whether or not the accused should be allowed 
to raise the objection based on lack of notice for the very first time longer after 
the relevant evidence was adduced (e.g., during closing arguments or during 
appeal).  The underlying doctrine is that of waiver.  As well, whether or not an 
accused raised an objection is crucial in determining who bears the burden of 
demonstrating whether the Accused was prejudiced by the defect in the indict-
ment—the accused or the Prosecution. As explained in the Niyitegeka Appeals 
Judgment, “a party should not be permitted to refrain from making an objection 
to a matter which was apparent during the course of the trial, and to raise it only 
in the event of an adverse finding against that party. Failure to object in the Trial 
Chamber will usually result in the Appeals Chamber disregarding the argument 
on grounds of waiver.  In the case of objections based on lack of notice, the De-
fence must challenge the admissibility of evidence of material facts not pleaded 
in the indictment by interposing a specific objection at the time the evidence is 
introduced. The Defence may also choose to file a timely motion to strike the 
evidence or to seek an adjournment to conduct further investigations in order to 
respond to the unpleaded allegation.”  Niyitegeka Appeals Judgment, supra note 
9, ¶ 190. The jurisprudence, however, has underscored the importance of an 
accused’s right to be informed of the charges against him and the possibility of 
serious prejudice to the accused if material facts crucial to the Prosecution are 
communicated for the first time at trial.  The jurisprudence thus stresses that the 
waiver doctrine does not extinguish the right of an accused to raise the objection 
at a latter stage.  According to the Niyitegeka Judgment, “the waiver doctrine 
should not entirely foreclose an accused from raising an indictment defect for 
the first time on appeal. Where, in such circumstances, there is a resulting defect 
in the indictment, an accused person who fails to object at trial has the burden of 
proving on appeal that his ability to prepare his case was materially impaired. 
Where, however, the accused person objected at trial, the burden is on the 
Prosecution to prove on appeal that the accused’s ability to prepare his defense 
was not materially impaired. All of this is of course subject to the inherent juris-
diction of the Appeals Chamber to do justice in the case.” Id. ¶ 200. 
114 Muhimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 4, ¶ 217 (citations omitted). 
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cally committed it.115  Moreover, by majority, the Appeals Cham-
ber held that the defect was not cured principally because the post-
indictment communication did not “simply add greater detail in a 
consistent manner with a more general allegation already pleaded 
in the indictment.  Rather, [it] modifies the time, location, and 
physical perpetrator, matters that were already specifically pleaded 
in the indictment, albeit in a materially different manner.”116  
¶45 The approach taken by the majority raises important 
questions.  It is questionable whether a strict approach, as taken by 
the majority—that post-indictment communications cannot modify 
an indictment—is always appropriate in prosecuting international 
crimes.  It appears that the Chamber took a rather strict approach 
mainly because, unlike in other cases, where post-indictment 
communications merely added greater detail to more general alle-
gations in the indictment, in the instant case, the post-indictment 
communications ‘modified’ matters already specifically pleaded in 
the indictment.117  This, according to the Chamber, was prejudicial 
to the Accused in mounting his defense.118  Arguably, the most 
critical test should be whether or not the modification was commu-
nicated in a clear, consistent and timely manner, and that the Ac-
cused’s right to prepare his defense was not materially impaired.  
In addition, the Appeals Chamber should have taken account of 
whether the post-indictment communication in this case, or the 
manner in which the case unfolded, amounted to what may be de-
scribed as the unpredictable and impermissible molding of the case 
as it progressed, thus prejudicing the Accused.  It is questionable 
whether in the instant case the Accused suffered prejudice, given 
that he presented a defense to the allegation as contained in the 
post-indictment communication, and only complained at the end of 
the trial (i.e., in his closing brief) and did not make a contempora-
neous objection when Prosecution witness AW testified that it was 
the Accused that had physically perpetrated the murder.119 
¶46 In his partially dissenting opinion in the same case, Judge 
Schomburg took a more liberal approach.  In his view, in prosecut-
ing cases, because an indictment is not the only way of informing 
                                                 
115 Id. ¶ 218. 
116 Id. ¶ 224. 
117 Id. ¶ 224-225 (distinguishing the instant case from the scenario in the 
Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, supra note 2).  
118 Id. ¶ 226. 
119 Id. ¶ 218. 
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an accused about the charges against him, and that in many cases 
the prosecution will not be in position to know all of the evidence 
at the early stage of the proceedings in which the indictment is 
filed, it is natural that in some situations the case may change as it 
proceeds and fresh evidence may in some circumstances be ad-
duced.  According to Judge Schomburg, 
[i]t is unrealistic to believe that the Prosecution is 
not confronted with changing evidence throughout 
the whole course of the proceedings.  It would be 
incredible or, at the very least, surprising if the fac-
tual basis of an Indictment remained unchanged af-
ter the finalization of investigations.  Even in cases 
where trial proceedings are already ongoing, it has 
to be and is possible to add fresh information to the 
case.  As it is at the same time still important to 
keep the accused informed about the charges 
against him, it is a generally accepted principle in 
criminal law, both in Anglo-Saxon and Romano-
Germanic influenced jurisdictions, that such addi-
tional information can also be given by an indica-
tion that the factual basis and/or the legal assess-
ment might be varied.120 
Judge Schomburg also stressed that modification of the informa-
tion, or the introduction of new facts, must be balanced with other 
factors, including the need to find the truth and the fundamental 
rights of the accused to be able to prepare his defense.121  In Judge 
Schomburg’s view, the Accused in this case suffered no prejudice 
as he was informed of the charges and the possibility to defend 
himself against a slightly varied charge.122  Judge Schomburg thus 
concluded that it is unjustified to acquit an accused under these 
circumstances, and that the Appeals Chamber should have used the 
opportunity presented in this case to clarify the jurisprudence.123  
Judge Schomburg’s dissent provides an important opportunity for 
the ICTR to clarify the jurisprudence in the future; it also provides 
                                                 
120 Muhimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 4, Partly dissenting opinion of 
Judge Schomburg on the interpretation of the right to be informed ¶¶ 7-8. 
121 Id. ¶ 12-16.  
122 Id. ¶ 14-15. 
123 Id. ¶ 14-16. 
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an alternative approach that may inspire other international tribu-
nals. 
VIII. THE STATUS OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE: WHEN CAN IT 
GROUND A CONVICTION? 
¶47 Before 2007, the Tribunal had established in general terms 
that hearsay evidence is not per se inadmissible, but during 2007, 
in the Ndindabahizi Appeals Judgment, the Tribunal was more di-
rectly confronted with assessing the adequacy of hearsay evidence 
in grounding a conviction. 
¶48 In Ndindabahizi, the Appeals Chamber (by majority, with 
Judge Shahabuddeen dissenting) vacated one count of genocide 
and a count of murder as a crime against humanity arising from the 
alleged instigation by the Accused of the death of a victim at a 
roadblock.124  According to the majority, it was not clear as to 
when the victim was killed following the Accused’s instigation, 
given that the only prosecution witness (witness CGC) was not 
present at the roadblock during the killing.  Furthermore, during 
trial, witness CGC was not asked, nor did he explain, how he came 
to learn that the victim was killed shortly after the Accused’s de-
parture from the roadblock.   
¶49 According to the Ndindabahizi Appeals Judgment, hearsay 
evidence is admissible, but it must be clear (and not vague) and it 
must be verifiable.125  In the instant case, according to the majority, 
it could not be verified as to how witness CGC knew the time 
when the victim was killed.  Judge Shahabuddeen wrote a separate 
opinion on the issue.126  According to Judge Shahabuddeen, wit-
ness CGC’s evidence was not the only evidence which showed that 
                                                 
124 See Ndindabahizi Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, ¶ 106-118. According to 
the indictment, during mid-April 1994, the Accused instigated and ordered per-
sons at roadblocks in Kibuye prefecture to kill civilians identified as Tutsi.  The 
public responses to his pronouncements were usually swift. Prosecutor v. Ndin-
dabahizi, Case No. ICTR 01-71, Indictment, ¶ 25 (July 8, 2003). The Accused 
was convicted by the Trial Chamber for murder as crime against humanity, find-
ing that in late-May 1994, the Accused visited one of the roadblocks (at a place 
called Gaseke), and inter alia, urged those manning the roadblock to stop and 
kill Tutsis.  The Trial Chamber concluded that on the same day, shortly after his 
departure, a victim named Nors was apprehended there and killed at the Gaseke 
roadblock. Ndindabahizi Trial Judgment, supra note 46, ¶¶ 230-231.  
125 Ndindabahizi Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, ¶ 115. 
126 Id. Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen ¶¶ 1-22.  
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the victim was killed shortly after Ndindabahizi’s departure from 
the roadblock.  Defense witness DB’s evidence showed that the 
victim was killed the same day the Accused passed through the 
roadblock.  Furthermore, Judge Shahabuddeen observed that it was 
necessary to take account of the fact that throughout the trial and in 
his written submissions filed on appeal, the Accused contended 
that he did not visit the roadblock at all—that was his main argu-
ment until asked by the Appeals Chamber through oral submis-
sions.127  His original argument was therefore not that, despite vis-
iting the roadblock, the interval between his visit (and therefore the 
instigation there) and the murder of the victim was too long as to 
establish a casual link between the two events.128  Judge Sha-
habuddeen observed that although the Accused was free to argue 
the additional matters raised by the Appeals Chamber during oral 
arguments, “his original stand has to be taken into account for the 
purpose of evaluating his new position.”129 
¶50 The approach taken by the Ndindabahizi Appeals Judgment 
also raises other interesting questions beyond the status of hearsay 
evidence.  For instance, it raises questions as to how the Tribunal 
should approach the ‘contribution’ of an accused’s criminal con-
duct to the perpetration of crimes.  The majority found that Ndin-
dabahizi could not be liable for instigation because prompting a 
crime through instigation requires a subsequent criminal act.130  
Given that evidence was lacking as to when persons instigated by 
the Accused murdered the victim, the Accused could not be liable 
for instigating the crime.  Arguably though, instead of focusing on 
the substantial contribution of an accused’s criminal conduct to the 
perpetration of a crime, focus should be put on the accused’s con-
duct as a manifestation of a willingness to be associated with a 
crime and his support of the principal perpetrator of the crime.  In 
the instant case, evidence showed that the Accused gave weapons 
and encouraged those at the roadblock to kill any Tutsi.  Tutsis 
were actually killed prior to and after the Accused’s visit to the 
                                                 
127 Id. ¶ 4. Prior to the oral submissions on appeal, a letter from the Presiding 
Judge to the parties dated 26 June 2006 requested the parties to make oral sub-
missions on, inter alia, the issue “whether, in case the Trial Chamber erred in 
finding that the killing of [the victim] occurred shortly after the Appellant’s visit 
on 20 May 1994, it has been proven that the Appellant’s actions substantially 
contributed to the killing of [the victim] on another date.”  Id.  
128 Id.  
129 Id. 
130 Ndindabahizi Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, ¶ 117. 
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roadblock.  Evidence also showed that Tutsis (and not only the one 
victim) were killed at the roadblock.  Thus, the Accused’s criminal 
conduct (namely, urging those manning the roadblock to stop and 
kill any Tutsi passing there, and providing them with weapons and 
money to enable them accomplish the task of killing) was a clear 
manifestation of a willingness to promote the crimes at the road-
block.  There is also need for judges to closely approach evidence 
adduced during trial in a holistic fashion, as opposed to a piece-
meal examination and evaluation of it.  This approach appears to 
have been emphasized by Judge Shahabuddeen in his separate 
opinion referenced above.  As shown, his opinion closely exam-
ined both the original position taken by the Accused during trial 
and the position taken in submissions on appeal in defense of the 
murder charge, vis-à-vis his new position during oral submissions.  
As well, Judge Shahabuddeen closely examined the evidence ad-
duced by the Accused’s own witness (DB), who confirmed that the 
victim was killed the same day the Accused visited the roadblock. 
IX.   OTHER ISSUES AND CONCLUSION 
¶51 In addition to the several issues discussed thus far, during the 
period under review, the Tribunal also addressed other important 
issues.  However, it is not possible to engage in a detailed analysis 
of all of them.  In summary, they include the following: firstly, the 
notion of witness proofing (i.e., the practice of the prosecution 
meeting with and preparing a witness prior to testimony).  In 2006, 
a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court found that the 
practice was impermissible,131 while the ICTR found the reverse in 
2007.132  In its jurisprudence on the issue in 2007, the ICTR ex-
plained that witness proofing was limited to witness preparation 
and did not extend to the manipulation of a witness’s evidence.133 
¶52 Secondly, the Tribunal elaborated some rights of the 
accused.  For instance, the Tribunal emphasized that an accused’s 
right to be tried in his presence means that an accused has a right to 
                                                 
131 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-679, 
Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, Pub-
lic, at 21-22 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Nov. 8, 2006).  
132 See Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.8, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, ¶¶ 14-15 (Appeals Chamber, 
May 11, 2007). 
133 Id. ¶¶ 4, 12.  
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be physically present at trial.134  However, an accused cannot claim 
violation of the right if he waives it, for instance, by refusing to 
attend court.135  Thirdly, the Tribunal for the first time, awarded 
financial compensation to an acquitted accused for violation of his 
right to legal assistance.136 
¶53 In addition, during the period under review, the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTR dealt with an appeal from an ICTR Trial 
Chamber conviction that, for the first time in the ICTR’s life, was  
grounded in the joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”) mode of criminal 
responsibility.137  Arguably, however, the jurisprudence engen-
dered raises some controversies in light of the then-existing juris-
prudence elaborated by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY.  Al-
though the Trial Chamber had found that there was a single JCE 
encompassing three geographically proximate massacre sites, it 
found the Accused culpable only for crimes committed at two mas-
sacre sites.  The Prosecution appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the 
Trial Chamber erred by acquitting Simba for the massacres perpe-
trated at the third massacres site principally because he was not 
physically present when the crimes were perpetrated there.  The 
Prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber required proof of physi-
cal presence at the third massacre site,138 whereas established juris-
prudence at the ICTY held that physical presence at the time the 
crime is committed is not required for JCE liability.139  Instead, ar-
gued the Prosecution, the Chamber should have considered the Ac-
cused’s presence and all his actions at the two massacre sites as 
proof of his active role in furthering the common purpose of the 
JCE that encompassed all three sites.140  The Appeals Chamber re-
jected the appeal.  It agreed with the Prosecution that indeed, the 
Trial Chamber had concluded that there was a single JCE encom-
                                                 
134 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.10, Decision On Nzi-
rorera’s Interlocutory Appeal Concerning His Right To Be Present During Trial, 
¶ 11 (Appeals Chamber, Oct. 5, 2007). 
135 Media Appeals Judgment, supra note 26, ¶¶ 93-116. 
136 See Rwamakuba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-A, Decision on 
Appeal against Decision on Appropriate Remedy, ¶¶ 31-32 (Appeals Chamber, 
Sept. 13, 2007). 
137 See Simba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Appeals Judgment (Nov. 
27, 2007) [hereinafter Simba Appeals Judgment]. 
138 The Prosecution’s arguments are summarized in the Simba Appeals Judg-
ment.  Id. ¶¶ 289-292. 
139 See e.g., Prosecutor v. Radoslav Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals 
Judgment, ¶¶ 112-113  (Feb. 28, 2005). 
140 Simba Appeals Judgment, supra note 137, ¶¶ 112-113. 
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passing all three massacre sites.141  However, regarding the Ac-
cused’s personal responsibility, the Appeals Chamber took the po-
sition that in subsequent paragraphs of its judgment, the Trial 
Chamber had qualified its finding that a JCE encompassed all three 
sites.142  The Chamber concluded that while the Trial Chamber was 
not explicit, it found that there was in effect a separate JCE limited 
to the two massacre sites, in which the Accused was a partici-
pant.143  Given that the Trial Chamber did not explain how the JCE 
which initially encompassed all the three locations subsequently 
became compartmentalized into two JCEs, the Appeals Chamber’s 
finding is thus arguably controversial.  The emphasis the Trial 
Chamber put on the Accused’s presence at the two massacre sites 
in reaching his conviction for the massacres there, as well as the 
emphasis it put on his absence at the third massacre site in return-
ing an acquittal verdict in respect of the third sites, arguably sug-
gests that the Trial Chamber incorrectly read physical presence as 
if it was a constituent requirement of JCE liability.  Moreover, 
given that the Accused made other forms of contribution to the 
JCE—such as providing weapons to the assailants and participat-
ing in planning the attacks at all three massacres sites—under the 
circumstances, his physical presence was not necessary to prove 
that he shared the intent to participate in the common purpose to 
kill victims at the third massacre site.144  Ultimately, physical pres-
ence was not necessary to prove the culpability of the Accused 
with respect to the crimes committed pursuant to JCE at all three 
sites.145  
¶54 Furthermore, over the course of 2007, the Tribunal addressed 
some important issues relating to a Chamber’s discretion to control 
proceedings.  The Tribunal found that a Chamber may regulate the 
number of witness the prosecution or the defense may call.146 
                                                 
141 Id. ¶ 295. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 
415, 419 (Trial Chamber I, Dec. 13, 2005)). 
144 The approach taken was contrary to that taken by the Appeals Chamber.  Id. ¶ 
296. 
145 See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Judg-
ment, ¶ 430 (Apr. 3, 2007) (holding that although an accused’s contribution to a 
JCE need not be substantial, it should at least be a significant contribution to the 
crimes for which the accused is found culpable). 
146 See Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Joint Case No. 
ICTR-98-42-T, Decision on Kanyabashi’s Motion to Vary His List of Witnesses 
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¶55 The Tribunal also for the first time found a witness guilty of 
contempt of court for giving false testimony under solemn oath.147  
The witness was sentenced to nine months imprisonment. 
¶56 Finally, the Tribunal rendered significant judgments 
following pleas of guilt.  The sentences it imposed arguably raises 
issues as to the weight to be given such pleas vis-à-vis other con-
siderations, including the gravity of the crimes.148  
¶57 Overall during 2007, the Tribunal did not break much new 
ground, but the Appeals Chamber did notably address some inter-
esting and significant issues.  The evolution of ICTR jurisprudence 
demonstrates that the process of elaborating international criminal 
law is a continuous one, and as such it can be anticipated that on-
going and future cases will likely raise further issues in the years to 
come.   
 
                                                                                                             
Pursuant to Rule 73ter, 17-18 (Trial Chamber II, Feb. 15, 2008). 
147 Prosecutor v. GAA, Case No. ICTR-07-90-R77-I, Judgment and Sentence, at 
6 (Trial Chamber III, Dec. 4, 2007). 
148 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rugambarara, Case No. ICTR-00-59-T, Sentencing 
Judgment, ¶ 61 (Trial Chamber II, November 16, 2007) (sentencing Rugam-
barara to eleven years imprisonment for extermination as crime against human-
ity); Prosecutor v. Nzabirinda, Case No. ICTR-2001-77-T, Sentencing Judg-
ment, ¶ 116 (Trial Chamber II, Feb. 23, 2007) (sentencing Nzabirinda to seven 
years imprisonment for murder as crime against humanity). 
